## 1ac

### Plan

The United States Federal Government should establish an ex parte and ex ante judicial review process utilizing a strict scrutiny standard for targeted killing by drones.

### Norms

Contention 1 – Accountability

#### Drone proliferation is coming – accountability is critical to prevent conflict.

Ingersoll and Kelley, Business Insider, 1-9-13

[Geoffrey and Michael, “America Is Setting A Dangerous Precedent For The Drone Age” <http://www.businessinsider.com/america-is-setting-a-dangerous-precedent-for-the-drone-age-2013-1>

The decisions America makes today regarding drone policy could come back to haunt it sooner

AND

is waging its fight against terrorism in accordance with the rule of law."

#### Drone conflict escalates.

Cronin, George Mason University public policy professor, 13

[Audrey Kurth, Foreign Affairs, Jul/Aug 2013, Vol 92 Issue 4, “Why Drones Fail” Ebsco, accessed 6-30-13, TAP]

The sometimes contradictory demands of the American people -- perfect security at home without burdensome

AND

-- then al Qaeda will be the least of the United States' worries.

#### Accountability gives the US leverage to pressure other countries into using best practices.

Zenko, CFR Center for Preventive Action Douglas Dillon fellow, 13

[Micah, Council Special Report No. 65, January 2013, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies”<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/16/clip_the_agencys_wings_cia_drones?page=full> p.24-5, accessed 6-20-13, TAP]

Beyond the United States, drones are proliferating even as they are¶ becoming increasingly

AND

likely to use lethal force against the United States¶ and its allies.

#### Drone prolif causes Iran-Israel war and escalates South and East China Sea tensions

Xiaolin, PhD student in Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National university of Singapore, 11-2-13

(Duan, “The Rise of the Drones,” http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/02/the-rise-of-the-drones/?all=true, accessed 11-4-13, CMM)

In a broader sense, America’s use of drones may create more strategic dilemmas for

AND

use should be taken very seriously, and condemned by the international community.

#### Middle East war draws in great powers – no checks on escalation. RUSSELL, Department of National Security Affairs senior lecturer at NPS, 9

[James A., , focused on Middle East security affairs, terrorism, and national security strategy. “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Nuclear War and Escalation in the Middle East” Spring http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&sqi=2&ved=0CBMQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nps.edu%2FAcademics%2Fcenters%2FCCC%2Ffaculty%2Fbiolinks%2Frussell%2FPP26\_Russell\_2009.pdf&rct=j&q=Strategic%20Stability%20Reconsidered%3A%20Prospects%20for%20Nuclear%20War%20and%20Escalation%20in%20the%20Middle%20East%22&ei=y\_dbTcmfD4K0lQeY7cTkCQ&usg=AFQjCNGBgAt5-o6WwVPg7b503iUYltj2nw&sig2=9rGfIq5oVZNvgR8pn8vhvA, page 41, accessed 2-16-11, CMM]

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1)

AND

the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

#### Asian instability escalates to nuclear war.

Landay, National Security and Intelligence Correspondent, 2K

(Jonathan S., “Top administration officials warn stakes for U.S. are high in Asian conflicts”, 3-10, Knight Ridder/Tribune News) Accessed on LexisNexis 12-29-09

Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea,

AND

that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.

### Terror

Contention 2 – Terrorism

#### Wide-scale restriction of drone use coming – only increasing accountability solves.

Zenko, CFR Center for Preventive Action Douglas Dillon fellow, 13

[Micah, Council Special Report No. 65, January 2013, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies”<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/16/clip_the_agencys_wings_cia_drones?page=full> p.22, accessed 6-20-13, TAP]

In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, President Obama declared:¶ “Where force

AND

the¶ United States modified its drone policy in the ways suggested below.

#### Public backlash culminates in a legal crackdown that hemorrhages the targeted killing program.

Goldsmith, Harvard University law professor, 12

[Jack, “Power and Constraint” [google books](http://books.google.com/books?id=Yi5-9bVd3YEC&pg=PA201&lpg=PA201&dq=power+and+constraint,+And+it+is+only+a+matter+of+time,+if+it+has+not+happened+already,+before+they+lead+the+U.S.+government+to+forgo+lawful+targeted+killing+actions+otherwise+deemed+to+be+in+the+interest+of+U.S.+national+security&source=bl&ots=7g6173TJSO&sig=mhMTjOq3Q0gzLibX9Hmtcr7snQs&hl=en&sa=X&ei=vmdLUrWtEJDs9ASQyIGIBg&ved=0CCsQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=power%20and%20constraint%2C%20And%20it%20is%20only%20a%20matter%20of%20time%2C%20if%20it%20has%20not%20happened%20already%2C%20before%20they%20lead%20the%20U.S.%20government%20to%20forgo%20lawful%20targeted%20killing%20actions%20otherwise%20de), p.199-201, accessed 9-30-13, TAP]

For the GTMO Bar and its cousin NGOs and activists, however, the al

AND

deemed to be in the interest of U.S. national security.

#### US counter-terror ops are expanding in Africa now.

Tinti, WPR, 13

(Peter, freelance journalist and analyst based in Bamako, Mali, and Dakar, Senegal, 1-2-13, “U.S. Debates Framework for Counterterror Operations in Africa,” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12593/u-s-debates-framework-for-counterterror-operations-in-africa, accessed 8-23-13, CMM)

Some of these core assumptions, however, are being reconsidered amid the revelation that

AND

have on relations between the U.S. and its African counterparts.

#### Unchecked executive power causes groupthink – that triggers massive policy errors.

Chehab, Georgetown Law Center, 12

[Ahmad, 3-30-12, “Retrieving the Role of Accountability in the Targeted Killings Context: A Proposal for Judicial Review” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2031572, p.30-3, accessed 9-15-13, TAP]

The practical, pragmatic justification for the COAACC derives largely from considering social psychological findings

AND

irrational persistence in pursuing ideological positions divorced from concern of alternative viewpoints.147

Professor Cass Sunstein has described situations in which groupthink produced poor results precisely because consensus

AND

1960’s,152 and the controversial decision to wage war against Vietnam.153

Professor Sunstein also has described the related phenomenon of “group polarization,” which includes

AND

and other associated deficiencies are inevitable features in Executive Branch decision-making.

[Tom note – Sunstein, University of Chicago and Harvard University law professor]

#### AQIM is a unique nuclear threat

FMWG, Fissile Materials Working Group ‘11

(Irma Arguello, David Culp, Ingrid Drake, Rob Golan-Vilella, Li Hong, Kenneth Luongo, Michelle Marchesano, Rajiv Nayan, Miles Pomper, William Potter, Kingston Reif, Jennifer Smyser, Elena Sokova, Peter Stockton, Alexandra Toma, Paul Walker, Peter Wilk, and Sarah Williams, all experts in the field, “After bin Laden: Nuclear terrorism still a top threat,” 5-13-11, <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/fissile-materials-working-group/after-bin-laden-nuclear-terrorism-still-top-t>, accessed 2-23-12) PM

The evolving threat. While Al Qaeda's anti-American ideology is unlikely to change

AND

Al Qaeda, a US priority must be securing this potential source material.

#### AQIM will have nuclear and biological weapon capabilities – and they will attack the US.

Allison, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs director, 12

[Graham, Harvard University government professor, 9-7-12, "Living in the Era of Megaterror" <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22302/living_in_the_era_of_megaterror.html>, accessed 9-30-13, TAP]

Forty years ago this week at the Munich Olympics of 1972, Palestinian terrorists conducted

AND

the eye can see, we will live in an era of megaterror.

#### Nuclear terror results in extinction.

Morgan, Hankuk University foreign studies professor, 9

[Dennis, Elsivier Vol 41 Issue 10, “World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race Futures” [www.cgee.org.br/atividades/redirKori/6255](http://www.cgee.org.br/atividades/redirKori/6255), p.685-6, accessed 9-30-13, TAP]

In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question ‘‘Is

AND

start through the accidental or reckless use of strategic weapons. [10]

#### Bioterror causes extinction.

Ochs, Chemical Weapons Working Group member, 2

[Richard , Former Aberdeen Proving Ground Superfund Citizens Coalition president, member of the Depleted Uranium Task force of the Military Toxics Project, “Biological Weapons Must Be Abolished Immediately” <http://www.freefromterror.net/other_articles/abolish.html>, accessed 10-28-10, TP]

Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many

AND

Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? Human extinction is now possible.

#### Unchecked Saharan terrorism spreads causes regional instability, environmental decline, and economic collapse

Metz, defense analyst, 13

(Steven, 1-23-13, “Strategic Horizons: Containment Should Guide U.S. Approach to al-Qaida in Africa,” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12657/strategic-horizons-containment-should-guide-u-s-approach-to-al-qaida-in-africa, accessed 8-23-13, CMM)

Today all conflicts have cascading effects, quickly engulfing neighboring states and, if unchecked

AND

al-Qaida-associated organizations is the least-bad option available.

#### AQIM will attack oil fields – that triggers global price spikes.

Jegarajah, CNBC News, 1-16-13

[Sri, “Algeria Attack 'Wake-Up' Call for Oil Markets” <http://www.cnbc.com/id/100386265>, accessed 9-30-13, TAP]

Global oil markets, under pressure from increased North American production, are facing the

AND

formidable in the region and yet we saw that they can be vulnerable."

#### Price spikes collapse the global economy.

The Economist, 11

(3-3-11, “The Price of Fear,” http://www.economist.com/node/18285768, accessed 11-7-11, CMM)

The reason for a rise in the oil price is as important as how large it is. An increase forced by higher demand is less dangerous than one driven by constricted supply, because it is evidence of a healthy global economy. If rapid growth means that China and India are importing more oil, they are probably importing larger amounts of other things as well, lessening the pain for slower-growing consumers of oil.

Nonetheless, whether driven by demand or supply, a large enough spike in the

AND

0.5% to 1% of GDP that simple extrapolation suggests.

James Hamilton, of the University of California, San Diego, has identified numerous

AND

, after the biggest one-week increase since Hurricane Katrina in 2005.

#### Economic collapse leads to global war.

Lind, New America Foundation Economic Growth Program Policy Director, 5/11/2010

[Michael, "Will the great recession lead to World War IV?," http://www.salon.com/news/economics/index.html?story=/opinion/feature/2010/05/11/great\_recession\_world\_war\_iv]

If history is any guide, an era of global economic stagnation will help the

AND

Eurasia, Eastasia and Oceania in 1984 is all too easy to imagine.

#### Drones are key.

Byman, Georgetown University security studies professor, 2013

[Daniel, Brookings Institution Saban Center for Middle East Policy senior fellow, foreign affairs, Jul/Aug 2013, Vol 92 Issue 4, “Why Drones Work” Ebsco, accessed 7-1-13, TAP]

The Obama administration relies on drones for one simple reason: they work. According

AND

forcing the group to choose between having no leaders and risking dead leaders.

### Solvency

#### Contention 3: Solvency

#### Ex ante review by a drone court solves group think.

Chehab, Georgetown Law Center, 12

[Ahmad, 3-30-12, “Retrieving the Role of Accountability in the Targeted Killings Context: A Proposal for Judicial Review” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2031572, p.33-4, accessed 9-15-13, TAP]

To check the vices of groupthink and shortcomings of human judgment, the psychology literature

AND

choices and evaluate available alternatives than when subject to little to no review.

#### Executive secrecy guts support for drones – a drone court garners legitimacy for the drone program.

Johnson, former Pentagon general counsel, 3-18-13

[Jeh Charles, “Keynote address at the Center on National Security at Fordham Law School: A “Drone Court”: Some Pros and Cons” <http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/03/jeh-johnson-speech-on-a-drone-court-some-pros-and-cons/>, accessed 9-3-13, TAP]

Thank you for this invitation. Today I want to join the current public debate

AND

who actually wouldn’t mind the added comfort of judicial imprimatur on their decisions.

#### Congress can establish an effective drone court – Congressional involvement creates credibility of drone strikes with the public.

McKelvey, Vanderbilt University JD Candidate, 11

[Benjamin, Vanderbilt journal of transnational law editorial board executive development editor, Vol 44, “Due Process Rights and the Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: The Unconstitutional Scope of Executive Killing Power” http://www.vanderbilt.edu/jotl/manage/wp-content/uploads/mckelvey-pdf.pdf, p.1378-9, accessed 9-15-13, TAP]

As the Aulaqi case demonstrates, any resolution to the problem ¶ of targeted killing

AND

the use of all ¶ peaceful measures before lethal force is pursued.212

#### ------------------Strict scrutiny solves.

Guiora, University of Utah law professor, 2012

[Amos, Case Western Reserve Journal of Internal Law, vol 45, “Targeted Killing: When Proportionality Gets All Out of Proportion” http://law.case.edu/journals/JIL/Documents/45CaseWResJIntlL1&2.13.Article.Guiora.pdf, p.239-40, accessed 9-15-13, TAP]

The solution to this search for an actionable guideline is the strict ¶ scrutiny standard

AND

balance enabling the ¶ state to act sooner but subject to significant restrictions.

The ability to act sooner is limited, however, by the requirement ¶ that intelligence information must be reliable, viable, valid, and ¶ corroborated. The strict scrutiny standard proposes that for states to ¶ act as early as possible in order to prevent a possible terrorist attack ¶ the information must meet admissibility standards similar to the rules ¶ of evidence. The intelligence must be reliable, material, and probative.

The proposal is predicated on the understanding that while states ¶ need to engage in operational counterterrorism, mistakes regarding ¶ the correct interpretation and analysis of intelligence information can ¶ lead to tragic mistakes. Adopting admissibility standards akin to the ¶ criminal law minimizes operational error.

Rather than relying on the executive branch making decisions in a ¶ “closed world

AND

court would significantly contribute to ¶ minimizing operational error that otherwise would occur.

#### Accountability allows the US to shape international norms.

Whibley, Victoria University of Wellington international relations MA, 2-6-13

[James, Georgetown journal of international affairs, “The Proliferation of Drone Warfare: The Weakening of Norms and International Precedent” <http://journal.georgetown.edu/2013/02/06/the-proliferation-of-drone-warfare-the-weakening-of-norms-and-international-precedent-by-james-whibley/>, accessed 7-29-13, TAP]

If drones are destined to proliferate, the more important issue may become whether American

AND

US, there is also the risk of weakening pre-existing international norms

about the use of violence. In the summer 2000 issue of International Security,

AND

, then surely China or Russia possessing such a program would be terrifying.

#### Trade doesn’t check

Medcalf, Lowy Institute (Sydney) International Security Programme Director, and Heinrichs, Australian National University Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Scholar, 11

(Rory and Raoul, 6-27-11, “Asia’s Maritime Confidence Crisis,” http://the-diplomat.com/2011/06/27/asia%E2%80%99s-maritime-confidence-crisis/?all=true, accessed 10-9-11, CMM)

To the casual observer, recent security tensions in Asian waters might seem a storm

AND

and confidence-building, these events are increasing in frequency and intensity.

 The harassment by Chinese civilian vessels of the USNS Impeccable in 2009 presaged a

AND

relations among major powers, with dangerous implications for regional peace and stability.

#### Institutions don’t check

Klare, Peace and World Security Studies professor at Hampshire, 1-23-13

(Michael, “The Next War,” 1-23-13, <http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/01/23/the_next_war_100500.html>, accessed 1-24-13) PM

Regional diplomacy, that classic way of settling disputes in a peaceful manner, has

AND

Chinese press, while officials there refused to cede any ground at all.

## 2ac

### 2ac – T – Restrictions

#### 1. We meet statutory restrictions.

Chehab, Georgetown Law Center, 2012

[Ahmad, 3-30-12, “Retrieving the Role of Accountability in the Targeted Killings Context: A Proposal for Judicial Review” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2031572, p.26-7, accessed 9-15-13, TAP]

The creation of the Covert Operations Against American Citizens Court (COAACC) would help

AND

the use of electronic eavesdropping in the context of foreign intelligence gathering.121

#### 2. We meet judicial restrictions.

Guiora, University of Utah law professor, 2012

[Amos, Case Western Reserve Journal of Internal Law, vol 45, “Targeted Killing: When Proportionality Gets All Out of Proportion” http://law.case.edu/journals/JIL/Documents/45CaseWResJIntlL1&2.13.Article.Guiora.pdf, p.239, accessed 9-15-13, TAP]

The solution to this search for an actionable guideline is the strict ¶ scrutiny standard

AND

balance enabling the ¶ state to act sooner but subject to significant restrictions.

#### We meet – a drone court restricts the president’s war power authority to do targeted killings.

Benson, CNN, 2-9-13

[Pam, “Drone court considered” <http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/02/09/legislators-consider-new-court-to-oversee-drone-strike-decisions/>, accessed 9-3-13, TAP]

Should federal judges weigh in on a president's decision to pursue and kill terrorists overseas

AND

the hearing was to create a new court to oversee such presidential decisions.

#### 3. Counter-interpretation – restriction means a limit and includes conditions on action.

Snow, COURT OF APPEALS OF ARIZONA judge, 8

(G. Murray, COURT OF APPEALS OF ARIZONA, DIVISION ONE, DEPARTMENT A, STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. JEREMY RAY WAGNER, Appellant., 2008 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 613, accessed 9-18-13, CMM)

P10 The term "restriction" is not defined by the Legislature for the purposes

AND

natural and obvious meaning, which may be discerned from its dictionary definition.").

P11 The dictionary definition of "restriction" is "[a] limitation or qualification

AND

dictate that the term "restriction" includes the ignition interlock device limitation.

### Secrecy

#### Creation of the court is sufficient to solve credibility and shape norms.

Wexler, University of Illinois law professor, 2013

[Lesley, 5-8-13, “The Role of the Judicial Branch during the Long War: Drone Courts, Damage Suits, and FOIA Requests” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2262412>, p.1-2, accessed 5-14-13, TAP]

Critics of the status quo would like greater transparency and accountability in regards to tar

AND

proposed the use of courts to foster either transparency or accountability or both.

### African Terrorism – Nigeria Add-On

#### Metz indicates AQIM crushes Nigerian stability – that’s key to African stability.

Pham, 2007 (J. Peter, Ph.D., World Defense Review columnist, 4/19/ “Decision Time in Nigeria,” Strategic Interest, <http://www.defend democracy.org /in\_the\_media/in\_the\_media\_show.htm?doc\_id=478937>)

All in all, it is bad enough that, as the International Crisis Group

AND

technologies, which would be available to destabilize the whole of West Africa.

#### African instability escalates to nuclear war.

Deutsch, 2002 (Dr. Jeffrey, economist, founder of Rabid Tiger Project, Rapid tiger newsletter, <http://www.rabidtigers.com/rtn/newsletterv2n9.html>) (no longer accessible)

The Rabid Tiger Project believes that a nuclear war is most likely to start in

AND

an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.

### 2ac – Flexibility DA

#### No deference link.

Chehab, Georgetown Law Center, 2012

[Ahmad, 3-30-12, “Retrieving the Role of Accountability in the Targeted Killings Context: A Proposal for Judicial Review” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2031572, p.29, accessed 9-15-13, TAP]

While in Hamdi, Justice O’Connor allowed for a presumption in favor of the government

AND

focus exclusively on the targeted individual and whether targeting is necessary and legal.

#### 5. No uniqueness – prez powers low and more Congressional backlash coming.

Rothkopf, Foreign Policy CEO, 8-31-13

[David, “The Gamble” https://www.google.com/search?q=rothkopf&oq=rothkopf&aqs=chrome..69i57j0l3.1891j0&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8, accessed 9-16-13, TAP]

Obama has reversed decades of precedent regarding the nature of presidential war powers -- and

AND

the imperial presidency than anything his predecessors or Congress have done for decades.

#### 6. No link uniqueness – Obama is restraining himself.

Goldsmith, Professor at Harvard Law School, 10

(Jack, 11-16-10, “The Virtues and Vices of Presidential Restraint,” http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/11/the-virtues-and-vices-of-presidential-restraint/, accessed 9-13-13, CMM)

I think there is something to this. In part in reaction to the excesses

AND

unprecedented restrictions on the President’s power to transfer enemy prisoners; and more.

#### 7. No link to the plan.

Daskal, Georgetown Center on national security and the law professor, 2013

[Jennifer, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165, “The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside the 'Hot' Conflict” http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1252&context=facsch\_lawrev

Zone, p.1223-4, accessed 12-16-13, TAP]

Conversely, some object to the use of courts or court-like review as

AND

, the judges would be issuing a warrant to kill rather than surveil.

While this is significant, it should not fundamentally alter the legal analysis.187

AND

deal with¶ exceptional cases where ex ante approval is not possible.191

#### 8. No link – strikes still get approved.

Chehab, Georgetown Law Center, 2012

[Ahmad, 3-30-12, “Retrieving the Role of Accountability in the Targeted Killings Context: A Proposal for Judicial Review” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2031572, p.30, accessed 9-15-13, TAP]

Although not a required form of analysis, these factors nonetheless suggest a rigorous review

AND

of American efforts to target alleged terrorists and reduce likelihood of collateral damage.

### 2ac – Obama – TPA

#### NO TPP even with TPA – it isn’t finished being negotiated.

Schneider, Washington Post, 11-13-13

(Howard, “For controversial trade pact, fire from the left, the right and WikiLeaks,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/for-controversial-trade-pact-fire-from-the-left-the-right-and-wikileaks/2013/11/13/118e5d28-4c9a-11e3-ac54-aa84301ced81\_story.html?wprss=rss\_business, accessed 11-14-13, CMM)

Despite Froman’s optimism, the opposition Wednesday did bring into focus the hurdles the administration

AND

“I will be voting no if this is not part of it.”

#### Won’t pass – Obama not pushing, Dems and anti-trade lobbies block

Chicago Tribune (editorial), 12-30-13

(“Editorial: Obama needs fast-track trade authority,” http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-12-30/opinion/ct-give-obama-tpa-fast-track-trade-edit-1230-jm-20131230\_1\_trade-deals-trade-promotion-authority-tpa, accessed 1-2-14, CMM)

President Barack Obama wants the power to negotiate free-trade treaties on a fast

AND

Hill and, especially, from the White House. Now's the time.

#### Baucus becoming ambassador kills trade agenda

Levy, Foreign Policy, 12-19-13

(Phil, “Baucus to Beijing Brings TPA, Trade Troubles,” http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/12/19/baucus\_to\_beijing\_brings\_tpa\_trade\_troubles, accessed 12-21-13, CMM)

This fall has been a roller-coaster ride for followers of trade. Against

AND

help with PR operations, but can prove disastrous for the battle itself.

#### TAA kills a deal

Sracic, professor and chairman of the political science department and Rigelhaupt Pre-Law Center at Youngstown State University, 12-16-13

(Paul, visiting research fellow at Gakushuin Women’s College in Tokyo, “Obama’s Trade Deal With Asia: Not So Fast,” http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-16/obama-s-trade-deal-with-asia-not-so-fast.html, accessed 1-2-14, CMM)

Trade Promotion Authority was last granted to President George W. Bush in 2002,

AND

Asia, the TPP may instead make its withering all the more apparent.

#### Winners win on controversial issues

Hirsh, National Journal, 2-7-13

(Michael, “There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital,” http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207?page=1, accessed 2-7-13, CMM)

Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority

AND

right. He did. (At least until Vietnam, that is.)

#### Obama supports the plan.

Roberts, The Guardian, 5-24-13

[Dan, “Obama drone oversight proposal prompts concern over 'kill courts'” http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/24/obama-drone-vetting-kill-courts, accessed 9-18-13, TAP]

The president has asked Congress to consider establishing a special court or oversight board to

AND

but raises serious constitutional issues about presidential and judicial authority," he said.

#### Turn – the plan is popular.

Hosenball, Reuters, 2-8-13

[Mark, “Support grows for U.S. "drone court" to review lethal strikes” <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/09/us-usa-drones-idUSBRE91800B20130209>, accessed 9-4-13, TAP]

During a fresh round of debate this week over President Barack Obama's claim that he

AND

. citizen alleged to be a "senior operational leader of Al Qaeda."

#### PC is irrelevant – Obama doesn’t have it, he isn’t using it, it isn’t effective, and XOs solve.

Boyer, Washington Times, 12-31-13

[Dave, “Obama’s liberal wish list for Congress likely to stall in election year” <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/dec/31/obamas-wish-list-likely-to-stall-in-election-year/print/>, accessed 1-2-14, TAP]

If President Obama thought 2013 was an unproductive year for his agenda in Congress,

AND

and I would put immigration in that category," Mr. Feehery said.

#### Iran sanctions thumps.

Rafizadeh, president of the International American Council and he serves on the board of Harvard International Review at Harvard University, 12-13-13

(Majid, senior fellow at Nonviolence International Organization based in Washington DC and a member of the Gulf project at Columbia University, “Kerry’s Iranian Appeasement Pitch to Congress,” http://www.frontpagemag.com/2013/majid-rafizadeh/kerrys-iranian-appeasement-pitch-to-congress/, accessed 1-1-14, CMM)

Finally, and more fundamentally, while the unemployment rate is high and economy is not showing AND

domestic economy, the destiny of millions of American youth and unemployment.

#### Immigration thumps.

Fox News, 1-1-14

(“After rough year, Obama looks for 2014 comeback, amid some unsolicited New Year's resolutions,” http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/01/01/after-rough-year-obama-looks-for-2014-comeback-amid-some-unsolicited-new-year/, accessed 1-1-14, CMM)

The president in the closing weeks of last year made clear that he would renew his push in 2014 to AND

 would likely help him regain some of his political clout.

#### Gun control thumps.

Goad, The Hill, 1-3-14

[Ben, “White House offers new regs on gun control, background checks” <http://thehill.com/blogs/regwatch/administration/194371-white-house-unveils-new-gun-control-effort>, accessed 1-3-14, TAP]

The Obama administration on Friday announced a new set of actions designed to keep weapons

AND

our efforts this year to enact commonsense gun safety laws,” Markey said.

### 2ac – Colonialism K

#### Evaluate consequences

Isaac, Indiana University James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life director, Spring 2002

(Jeffrey C. “Ends, Means, and Politics,” Dissent Magazine Vol. 49 Issue 2, p32)

Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It

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not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### No war impact.

Hinde and Pulkkinnen, Cambridge psychology professor and University of Jyväskylä psychology professor, 2000

[Robert and Lea,  [DRAFT Background Paper for Working Group 1: HUMAN AGGRESSIVENESS AND WAR, 50th Pugwash Conference On Science and World Affairs: "Eliminating the Causes of War" Queens' College, Cambridge , UK, 3-8 August <http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac/pac256/WG1draft1.htm>](http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac/pac256/WG1draft1.htm)]

People are capable of perpetrating the most terrible acts of violence on their fellows.

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multiple causes, and the interactions between the causal factors remain largely unexplored.

#### Turn – global drone use is inevitable – only the plan creates a framework for use.

Boyle, La Salle University political science assistant professor, 2013

[Michael, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare” http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89\_1/89\_1Boyle.pdf, p.28-9, accessed 9-8-13, TAP]

A final, and crucial, step towards mitigating the strategic consequences of drones ¶

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architecture which might avert ¶ some of the worst consequences of their use.

#### Legal reforms dampen emergency powers – proves NO IMPACT and the PERM solves.

O’Cinneide, University College London senior law lecturer, 2008

[Colm, “‘Dampening’: How Legal Mechanisms Can Offer a Partial Respite from the Counter-Terrorism Cycle” <http://epress.anu.edu.au/war_terror/mobile_devices/ch15s07.html>, accessed 9-30-13, TAP]

However, certain legal processes appear to have some capacity to slow down the excesses

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repression: the need for mobilisation in response may therefore also be diluted.

### 2ac – HR Cred Add-On

#### Restrictions key to human rights cred.

Daskal, Georgetown Center on national security and the law professor, 2013

[Jennifer, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165, “The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside the 'Hot' Conflict” http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1252&context=facsch\_lawrev

Zone, p.1232, accessed 12-16-13, TAP]

Fourth, such self-imposed restrictions are more consistent with the¶ United States’ long-standing AND

 applicable¶ human rights and domestic law enforcement norms.

#### Solves global war.

Burke-White, Princeton University international affairs professor, 2004

[William, 17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 249, “U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: ARTICLE: Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic Correlation” Lexis, accessed 12-30-13, TAP]

This Article presents a strategic--as opposed to ideological or normative--argument that

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by human rights can significantly enhance U.S. and global security.

Since 1990, a state's domestic human rights policy appears to be a telling indicator

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U.S.-U.N. cooperation on human rights issues.

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### Drone Norms Solve Colonialism

#### 10. Turn – the alt makes authoritarianism and oppression inevitable.

Boyle, La Salle University political science assistant professor, 2013

[Michael, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare” http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89\_1/89\_1Boyle.pdf, p.25-6, accessed 9-8-13, TAP]

Fourth, there is a distinct danger that the world will divide into two camps: ¶ developed states in possession of drone technology, and weak states and rebel¶ movements that lack them. States with recurring separatist or insurgent problems ¶ may begin to police their restive territories through drone strikes, essentially ¶ containing the problem in a fixed geographical region and engaging in a largely ¶ punitive policy against them. One could easily imagine that China, for example, ¶ might resort to drone strikes in Uighur provinces in order to keep potential threats ¶ from emerging, or that Russia could use drones to strike at separatist movements ¶ in Chechnya or elsewhere. Such behaviour would not necessarily be confined to ¶ authoritarian governments; it is equally possible that Israel might use drones to ¶ police Gaza and the West Bank, thus reducing the vulnerability of Israeli soldiers ¶ to Palestinian attacks on the ground. The extent to which Israel might be willing ¶ to use drones in combat and surveillance was revealed in its November 2012 attack ¶ on Gaza. Israel allegedly used a drone to assassinate the Hamas leader Ahmed Jabari ¶ and employed a number of armed drones for strikes in a way that was described ¶ as ‘unprecedented’ by senior Israeli officials.148 It is not hard to imagine Israel ¶ concluding that drones over Gaza were the best way to deal with the problem ¶ of Hamas, even if their use left the Palestinian population subject to constant, ¶ unnerving surveillance. All of the consequences of such a sharp division between ¶ the haves and have-nots with drone technology is hard to assess, but one possibility is that governments with secessionist movements might be less willing to ¶ negotiate and grant concessions if drones allowed them to police their internal ¶ enemies with ruthless efficiency and ‘manage’ the problem at low cost. The result ¶ might be a situation where such conflicts are contained but not resolved, while ¶ citizens in developed states grow increasingly indifferent to the suffering of those ¶ making secessionist or even national liberation claims, including just ones, upon ¶ them.

### AT: Prior Question

#### Constructing prior questions doesn’t disprove the aff – it results in generalizations and inaction.

Owen, University of Southampton political theory professor, 2002

[David, Millennium Journal of International Studies, Vol 31 No 3, “Re-orienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Practical Reason” Sagepub, accessed 9-30-13, TAP]

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a]¶ frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this¶ philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are¶ often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates¶ concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the¶ contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it¶ is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary¶ disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical¶ commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt¶ that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the¶ commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical¶ positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I¶ will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has,¶ I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this¶ philosophical turn.

The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over¶ explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a¶ simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive¶ power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological¶ and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features¶ would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it¶ is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments.¶ Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory¶ to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of¶ problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of¶ collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the¶ advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why¶ this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems¶ (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these¶ circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory)¶ and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not¶ undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice¶ theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while¶ the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological¶ and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it¶ is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind.

The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction¶ from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than¶ problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can¶ be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible¶ true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is¶ to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on¶ the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the¶ inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a¶ reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description¶ that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or¶ theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken¶ belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations¶ are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar¶ terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the¶ enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for¶ classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be¶ prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily¶ slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical¶ validity.

The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the¶ formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might¶ be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely,¶ an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional¶ temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of¶ sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because¶ the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things¶ right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and¶ epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first¶ and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

#### No self-fulfilling prophecy

Blumenthal, current commissioner and former vice chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 10-3-11

(Dan, “The Top 10 Unicorns of China Policy,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/03/the\_top\_ten\_unicorns\_of\_china\_policy?page=full, accessed 10-5-11, CMM)

Here are my own top 10 China-policy unicorns: The self-fulfilling prophecy. This is the argument that has the most purchase over the United States' China policy. Treat China like an enemy, the belief goes, and it will become an enemy. Conversely, treat China like a friend, and it will become a friend. But three decades of U.S.-China relations should at least cast doubt on this belief. Since the normalization of relations with China, the aim of U.S. policy has been to bring China "into the family of nations." Other than China itself, no nation has done more than the United States to improve the lot of the Chinese people and welcome China's rise peacefully. And, rather than increase its deterrence of China -- a natural move given the uncertainty attendant to the rise of any great power -- the United States has let its Pacific forces erode and will do so further. The United States may soon go through its third round of defense cuts in as many years. Here is just one example of how unserious the United States is about China: As China continues to build up its strategic forces, the United States has signed a deal with Russia to cap its strategic forces without so much as mentioning China. Unless Beijing was insulted by this neglect, surely it could take great comfort in an anachronistic U.S. focus on arms control with Russia. But despite U.S. demonstrations of benevolence, China still views the United States as its enemy or, on better days, its rival. Its military programs are designed to fight the United States. The self-fulfilling prophecy is far and away the most fantastical claim about China policy and thus the No. 1 unicorn.

### AT: Alt Mindset Shift

#### The pressures of fight terror have changed Obama motives

Rucker and Eilperin, Washington Post, 13

(Philip and Juliet, 6-7-13, “Obama undergoes a philosophical shift on counterterrorism surveillance,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-strives-for-pragmatic-compromises-on-counterterrorism-surveillance/2013/06/07/f8ee4302-cf88-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497\_story.html, accessed 8-22-13, CMM)

As a junior senator with presidential aspirations, Barack Obama built his persona in large part around opposition to Bush administration counterterrorism policies, and he sponsored a bill in 2005 that would have sharply limited the government’s ability to spy on U.S. citizens.¶ That younger Obama bears little resemblance to the commander in chief who stood on a stage here Friday, justifying broad programs targeting phone records and Internet activities as vital tools to prevent terrorist attacks and protect innocent Americans.¶ The former constitutional law professor — who rose to prominence in part by attacking what he called the government’s post-Sept. 11 encroachment on civil liberties — has undergone a philosophical evolution, arriving at what he now considers the right balance between national security prerogatives and personal privacy.¶ “I came in with a healthy skepticism about these programs,” Obama said in San Jose on Friday. “My team evaluated them. We scrubbed them thoroughly. We actually expanded some of the oversight, increased some of safeguards. But my assessment and my team’s assessment was that they help us prevent terrorist attacks.”¶ “On net,” the president added, “it was worth us doing.”¶ As Obama strived to reassure the American people following startling revelations this week about top-secret federal data-mining and surveillance programs, he said that he, too, has long been torn on the issue and that there is no easy answer.¶ “You can’t have 100 percent security and also then have 100 percent privacy and zero inconvenience,” he said. “We’re going to have to make some choices as a society.”¶ Obama and his advisers and allies argue that the compromises he has made have helped safeguard the United States from a large-scale strike like the one that al-Qaeda pulled off nearly a dozen years ago.¶ “When you’re president of the United States, you begin every day with these briefings,” said David Axelrod, Obama’s longtime political consigliere and former White House adviser.¶ “I know that he lives every day with the reality that there are threats out there. That has to be an animating principle for any person,” Axelrod added. “It is a natural thing to want to do everything that you can within the appropriate parameters to thwart those threats.”¶ But Obama’s approach has disappointed many of his political supporters and is also serving as a rallying cry for conservative libertarians and tea party leaders, who find themselves in sync with many liberals on the surveillance issue.¶ Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.), considered a possible candidate to succeed Obama in 2016, called the surveillance programs “an astounding assault on the Constitution.”¶ For critics on both sides, the issue highlights the enduring power of the national security apparatus that President George W. Bush put in place after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.¶ University of Chicago law professor Geoffrey R. Stone, who hired Obama to teach there and advised his 2008 campaign, said some might have engaged in “wishful thinking” by assuming Obama was more liberal on the issue of personal privacy than he really is.¶ “He’s not a passionate civil libertarian; he’s a rational civil libertarian,” Stone said. “He’s cold and reasoned and fact-based. He’s not likely to go off the tracks in either direction.”¶ In private meetings at the White House, Obama is more pragmatic than ideological on national security issues, advisers say.¶ “What he wrestles with is when fighting an enemy like al-Qaeda, a terrorist group that operates in very nimble ways, how do we make sure we have authorities to target them and disrupt their activities without going overboard?” said Benjamin J. Rhodes, the deputy national security adviser. Rhodes helped Obama prepare his remarks here Friday, as well as a major national security address last month at the National Defense University.¶ In that speech, Obama declared that the United States had reached a “crossroads” in its fight against terrorism, as the post-Sept. 11 wars come to an end. He defended the drone program he expanded as effective, acknowledging that it kills civilians and outlining narrower guidelines for launching strikes.¶ Rhodes rejected a comparison between Obama and Bush as “overstated,” noting that Obama has dismantled key pieces of Bush’s national security legacy — from ending the war in Iraq to prohibiting torture to pushing, unsuccessfully so far, to close the military’s detention center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.¶ “At the same time, we’re not simply going to shut down every counterterrorism tool that we have,” Rhodes said. “We’re going to use the ones that are effective and in line with the rule of law.”

### Predicitions

#### Linear predictions are feasible – empirically evidence proves

Chernoff, Prof. IR and Dir. IR – Colgate U, 9

(Fred,., European Journal of International Relations, “Conventionalism as an Adequate Basis for Policy-Relevant IR Theory”, 15:1, Sage, accessed 10-22-12, CMM)

For these and other reasons, many social theorists and social scientists have come to the conclusion that prediction is impossible. Well-known IR reflexivists like Rick Ashley, Robert Cox, Rob Walker and Alex Wendt have attacked naturalism by emphasizing the interpretive nature of social theory. Ashley is explicit in his critique of prediction, as is Cox, who says quite simply, ‘It is impossible to predict the future’ (Ashley, 1986: 283; Cox, 1987: 139, cf. also 1987: 393). More recently, Heikki Patomäki has argued that ‘qualitative changes and emergence are possible, but predictions are not’ (Patomäki, 2002: 157, reiterated at 2002: 191). He says neither mathematical,¶ statistical models nor rational choice models are capable of prediction (Patomäki, 2002: 135, 168–73).¶ Other reflexivist theorists reject prediction more by omission. For example,¶ Walker and Wendt are less explicit but are still quite clear in their rejections of¶ prediction in IR. While Walker (1993) offers a sustained critique of naturalism¶ and the empiricist (though not empirical) approach to the social sciences,¶ he focuses on the logic of explanation and the presuppositions of the dominant¶ forms of theory rather than questions connected to ‘prediction’. He¶ ignores the notion of ‘prediction’. Wendt is of course one of the principal figures¶ in American constructivism and, like others in that group, emphasizes¶ scientific-style explanation. But at no point does he endorse prediction.¶ Wendt lays out his extensive metatheory in Social Theory of International¶ Politics (1999) but barely even mentions ‘prediction’.¶ Rationalist scholars rarely note the problem that prediction – scepticism¶ creates for the empirical value that IR theory might have. John Mearsheimer¶ is one of the exceptions. He observes that reflexivists hope to improve the¶ world by making it more cooperative and peaceful, which they hold will be¶ advanced by eliminating the ‘hegemonic discourse’ of realism. But, as¶ Mearsheimer points out, if the reflexivists were to eliminate the hegemonic¶ discourse, then, since they do not have any way to predict what would follow¶ in its place, the change may be a shift from realism to fascism.12¶ There is a related but somewhat more radical implication, which¶ Mearsheimer does not mention, namely that without any ability to predict in¶ the social world, it is possible that reflexivists may succeed in creating a more¶ institutionally oriented discourse, but that discourse might not produce any¶ change whatever in real-world politics. If they reject causal (probabilistic)¶ connections projected into the future between events, states of affairs, or¶ event-types, then there is no reason to believe that any specific change will¶ lead to any effect at all.13¶ While it is clear that prediction-scepticism creates severe problems for the¶ claim that the work of IR scholars might contribute to the needs of policymaking,¶ the question remains, ‘are the arguments against predictiveness of¶ social science theory well founded?’ On what are these rejections based? The¶ trend in IR toward rejecting or downgrading ‘prediction’ is based on and¶ reinforced by various developments in current philosophy of social science.¶ IR scholars draw on three different sources of prediction – scepticism in the¶ philosophy of social science: the indeterminacy of social theory (Weber,¶ 1949, 1974; Habermas, 1971, 1987; Bohman, 1993; and Bernstein et al.,¶ 2000); the lack of governing regularities in the social sciences (Cartwright,¶ 1983; Little, 1991) and the effects of nonlinearities (Doran, 1991, 1999).¶ I have argued elsewhere that all three sorts of anti-predictive arguments are¶ defective and that the latter two presuppose an unjustifiably narrow notion of ‘prediction’.14 ¶ A determined prediction sceptic may continue to hold that there is too great a degree of complexity of social relationships (which comprise ‘open systems’) to allow any prediction whatsoever. Two very simple examples may circumscribe and help to refute a radical variety of scepticism. First, we all make reliable social predictions and do so with great frequency. We can predict with high probability that a spouse, child or parent will react to certain well-known stimuli that we might supply, based on extensive past experience. More to the point of IR prediction – scepticism, we can imagine a young child in the UK who (perhaps at the cinema) (1) picks up a bit of 19th-century British imperial lore thus gaining a sense of the power of the crown, without knowing anything of current balances of power, (2) hears some stories about the US–UK invasion of Iraq in the context of the aim of advancing democracy, and (3) hears a bit about communist China and democratic Taiwan. Although the specific term ‘preventative strike’ might not enter into her lexicon, it is possible to imagine the child, whose knowledge is thus limited, thinking that if democratic Taiwan were threatened by China, the UK would (possibly or probably) launch a strike on China to protect it, much as the UK had done to help democracy in Iraq. In contrast to the child, readers of this journal and scholars who study the world more thoroughly have factual information (e.g. about the relative military and economic capabilities of the UK and China) and hold some cause-and-effect principles (such as that states do not usually initiate actions that leaders understand will have an extremely high probability of undercutting their power with almost no chances of success). Anyone who has adequate knowledge of world politics would predict that the UK will not launch a preventive attack against China. ¶ In the real world, China knows that for the next decade and well beyond the UK will not intervene militarily in its affairs. While Chinese leaders have to plan for many likely — and even a few somewhat unlikely — future possibilities, they do not have to plan for various implausible contingencies: they do not have to structure forces geared to defend against specifically UK forces and do not have to conduct diplomacy with the UK in a way that would be required if such an attack were a real possibility. Any rational decision-maker in China may use some cause-and-effect (probabilistic) principles along with knowledge of specific facts relating to the Sino-British relationship to predict (P2) that the UK will not land its forces on Chinese territory — even in the event of a war over Taiwan (that is, the probability is very close to zero). The statement P2 qualifies as a prediction based on DEF above and counts as knowledge for Chinese political and military decision-makers. A Chinese diplomat or military planner who would deny that theory-based prediction would have no basis to rule out extremely implausible predictions like P2 and would thus have to prepare for such unlikely contingencies as UK action against China. ¶ A reflexivist theorist sceptical of ‘prediction’ in IR might argue that the China example distorts the notion by using a trivial prediction and treating it as a meaningful one. But the critic’s temptation to dismiss its value stems precisely from the fact that it is so obviously true. The value to China of knowing that the UK is not a military threat is significant. The fact that, under current conditions, any plausible cause-and-effect understanding of IR that one might adopt would yield P2, that the ‘UK will not attack China’, does not diminish the value to China of knowing the UK does not pose a military threat. A critic might also argue that DEF and the China example allow non-scientific claims to count as predictions. But we note that while physics and chemistry offer precise ‘point predictions’, other natural sciences, such as seismology, genetics or meteorology, produce predictions that are often much less specific; that is, they describe the predicted ‘events’ in broader time frame and typically in probabilistic terms. We often find predictions about the probability, for example, of a seismic event in the form ‘some time in the next three years’ rather than ‘two years from next Monday at 11:17 am’. DEF includes approximate and probabilistic propositions as predictions and is thus able to catagorize as a prediction the former sort of statement, which is of a type that is often of great value to policy-makers. ¶ With the help of these ‘non-point predictions’ coming from the natural and the social sciences, leaders are able to choose the courses of action (e.g. more stringent earthquake-safety building codes, or procuring an additional carrier battle group) that are most likely to accomplish the leaders’ desired ends. So while ‘point predictions’ are not what political leaders require in most decision-making situations, critics of IR predictiveness often attack the predictive capacity of IR theory for its inability to deliver them. The critics thus commit the straw man fallacy by requiring a sort of prediction in IR (1) that few, if any, theorists claim to be able to offer, (2) that are not required by policy-makers for theory-based predictions to be valuable, and (3) that are not possible even in some natural sciences.15